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integrity of the markets, on the one hand, and the useful function of Wall
Street professionals, on the other. In the absence of a clear breach of
confidence to an employer or client, the SEC should proceed cautiously.
Moreover, the SEC should seek tippee liability only when it can clearly
establish knowledge by a tippee of a breach of such confidence. An over-
zealous enforcement policy can impede the free flow of information ne-
cessary to creating more efficient markets.61
Christine M. Ramatowski
THE WILLIAMS ACT AND PREEMPTION OF SECOND
GENERATION STATE TAKEOVER
LEGISLATION
In 1982, in Edgar v. MITE Corp.,' the United States Supreme Court
declared unconstitutional the Illinois Business Takeover Act.2 A major-
ity of the Court found that the statute impermissibly burdened interstate
commerce.' Three justices argued further that the Williams Act,4 the
principal federal legislation regulating corporate takeovers, preempted
the Illinois act.' Two justices disagreed, interpreting the Williams Act to
leave some room for state regulation of corporate takeovers.
61. See The SEC v. Wall Street, supra note 2; but ef Laderman, supra note 1.
1. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
2. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 12 11/2, § 137.51 et seq. (1979). See infra notes 19-22 and accompany-
ing text.
3. 457 U.S. at 643-46.
4. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(f),
78n(d)-(e) (1982)).
5. 457 U.S. at 620-40. Article VI, clause 2 of the United States Constitution provides that
"the Laws of the United States... shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." The Supreme Court has held
that the supremacy clause invalidates not only state laws that conflict directly with the operation of
federal law, but also state laws that conflict with the purposes of the federal law. See, e.g., Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 229-30 (1947).
6. Justice Powell found nothing in the Williams Act to suggest "a congressional intent to
prohibit state legislation designed to assure-at least in some circumstances-greater protection to
interests that include but often are broader than those of incumbent management." 457 U.S. at 646,
647 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Stevens discerned no "prohibition against state legislation
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Recently, several federal courts have extended the MITE plurality's
preemption analysis to invalidate state takeover legislation designed to
avoid the Court's objections to the Illinois Act.7 In preempting these so-
called "second-generation statutes," however, the courts jumped too ea-
gerly onto the MITE plurality's bandwagon. Applying literally the lan-
guage of the MITE plurality, the courts failed to distinguish the effects of
these statutes from the effects of the Illinois act involved in MITE. In
fact, the second-generation statutes involved in these cases arguably ef-
fectuate the purposes underlying the Williams Act. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, extending the reasoning of the MITE plurality to these statutes
has broad implications for other areas of corporate law that traditionally
have been, and should continue to be, left to the states. This Recent
Development examines these issues and concludes that these cases repre-
sent an inappropriate extension of the rationale of the MITE plurality.
I. EDGAR V MITE CORP. AND THE PREEMPTIVE EFFECT OF THE
WILLIAMS ACT
A. The Williams Act
Congress enacted the Williams Act in 1968 to fill a gap in the protec-
tion offered investors under the federal securities laws.8 Although the
federal securities laws regulated other forms of effecting a change of cor-
porate control, such as proxy contests9 and mergers, ° neither the federal
government nor the states regulated cash tender offers. As in these other
areas, Congress elected to regulate takeovers primarily through disclo-
sure.It It did, however, extend shareholders some substantive protection
against the coercive nature of tender offers. Thus, the Act seeks to give
designed to provide special protection for incumbent management." Id. at 647, 655 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
7. See Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir.), prob. juris noted,
107 S. Ct. 258 (1986); Terry v. Yamashita, 643 F. Supp. 161 (D. Hawaii 1986); Fleet Aerospace
Corp. v. Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986); APL Ltd.
Partnership v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1216 (D. Minn. 1985); Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F.
Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
8. See H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2811, 2813 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]; S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1967) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
9. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)-(c) (1982).
10. The federal securities laws regulate mergers through (1) the proxy regulations, see id., when
shareholder votes are required by state law, and (2) the registration requirements under the Securi-
ties Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1982), when shares are exchanged.
11. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 2812-13; SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 3.
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shareholders sufficient time to decide whether or not to tender their
shares pursuant to a tender offer. 12
To effectuate these purposes, the Williams Act requires a tender of-
feror to file certain disclosures concerning his bid with the Securities and
Exchange Commission.13 The Act also compels the bidder to keep his
offer open for at least twenty business days. 14 Once a shareholder ten-
ders his shares, the Act extends him limited withdrawal rights with re-
spect to those shares. 5 In a partial tender offer, the bidder must purchase
the tendered shares on a pro rata basis.' 6 Finally, if the offeror increases
his offering price, all tendering shareholders are entitled to the higher
consideration, even those who deposited their shares before the
increase.17
B. Edgar v. MITE Corp. and State Regulation of Takeovers
Apparently dissatisfied with the protection afforded investors by the
Williams Act, and motivated in part by a desire to protect local corpora-
tions from takeovers,' 8 37 states enacted legislation regulating tender of-
fers. These statutes emulated, but often went beyond, the provisions of
the Williams Act. The Illinois act at issue in MITE was typical. It re-
quired that the offeror disclose his intentions prior to commencing a
bid."' It also authorized Illinois' Secretary of State to hold a hearing on
the offer, either at his discretion or at the request of any person owning at
12. See HoUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 2812.
13. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(1), 78n(d)(1) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (1986). The Act also
subjects solicitations and recommendations concerning an offer, including those of incumbent man-
agement, to similar disclosure requirements. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-
9 (1986). Indeed, target management must disclose its position on a proposed tender offer within ten
days of announcement of the bid. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1986).
14. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1986).
15. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (1986).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982).
17. Id. at § 78n(d)(7).
18. In fact, some states enacted legislation designed to thwart specific takeover attempts of
corporations within the state. Missouri enacted a tender offer statute to protect Trans World Air-
lines, Inc. from Carl C. Icahn's takeover attempt. Utah sought to block the rumored Arab takeover
of Kennecott Copper Corp. See Comment, Edgar v. MITE Corp. Is the Preemption of State Take-
over Statutes Complete, 1983 UTAH L. REV. 415, 422-23.
19. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 /2, § 137.54.A. (1979). In enacting the Williams Act, Congress
specifically refused to provide for such pre-commencement notification of the target corporation by a
bidder. Compare 113 CONG. REC. 854, 856-57 (1967) (text of S. 510 reintroduced in the 90th Con-
gress by Senator Williams) with 111 CONG. REC. 28256, 28258 (1965) (statement of Senator Wil-
liams describing S. 2731, the predecessor of S. 510 introduced in the 89th Congress).
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least ten percent of the corporation's outstanding shares.2" If the secre-
tary found that the offeror failed to provide "full and fair disclosure" or
that the offer was inequitable, the offer could not proceed. 2' In any
event, the offer could not proceed until the secretary completed the
hearing.22
Relying on the legislative history of the Williams Act, the plurality in
MITE argued that the Illinois statute frustrated the Williams Act's poli-
cies of neutrality23 and investor autonomy.2a The provisions for precom-
mencement notification and administrative hearings introduced extended
delay into the tender offer process, giving incumbent management addi-
tional time to combat the offer, and thereby unduly favored target man-
agement in a takeover contest.25  Allowing a state official to block a
tender offer substituted "investor protection" for "investor autonomy,"
contrary to Congress' desire that investors decide whether or not to
tender their shares pursuant to a tender offer.26
II. SECOND GENERATION STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES AND THE
EXTENSION OF EDGAR V. MITE CORP.
In the wake of MITE, several states enacted various types of statutes
regulating corporate takeovers.27  Generally, these second-generation
state statutes seek to regulate tender offers in a manner consistent with
the state's existing regulation of corporations.28 State corporation law
traditionally has provided the substantive regulation of mergers, in part
by requiring the affirmative vote of the shareholders before a proposed
20. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 'A, at § 137.54.A.
21. Id. at § 137.54.F.
22. Id. at § 137.54.B.
23. The MITE plurality viewed the Williams Act as establishing a balance between incumbent
management and tender offerors. 457 U.S. at 634. This notion derives from several statements in
the legislative history of the Act to the effect that Congress took "extreme care to avoid tipping the
scales either in favor of management or in favor of the persons making the takeover bids." 113
CONG. REc. 24664 (1967) (statement of Senator Williams); see also HousE REPORT, supra note 8, at
2813; SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 3.
24. The MITE plurality explained the Williams Act's concept of investor autonomy as follows:
once target management had been given opportunity to express its position on a tender offer, "Con-
gress anticipated that the investor if he so chose, and the takeover bidder should be free to move
forward within the time-frame provided by Congress." 457 U.S. at 634.
25. 457 U.S. at 634-39.
26. Id. at 639-40.
27. See generally Thompson, Defining the Federal and State Realms of Tender Offer Regula-
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merger can go through.29 One type of second-generation statute, the so-
called "control share acquisition statute," simply seeks to subject tender
offers to a similar vote. °
Inevitably, these statutes delay the tender offer process. After the of-
feror notifies the target corporation of its offer, target management must
call a meeting of the shareholders to vote on the proposed acquisition
and solicit proxies on the matter. Although most control share acquisi-
tion statutes require that the meeting be held within fifty days after the
offeror notifies the target corporation,31 the logistical problems associated
with calling a shareholder meeting (as well as target management's self-
interest) ensure that the meeting will not occur significantly before the
end of the fifty day period. During this time, the bidder cannot close his
offer.
In light of the MITE plurality's focus on delay under the Illinois
statute, this delay figured prominently in Supremacy Clause challenges to
control share acquisition statutes. The potential fifty day delay, the
courts maintained, thwarted the purposes of the Williams Act by ex-
tending its twenty business day (approximately 28 day) timetable. In the
words of Judge Posner in Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp.,32 "if
the Williams Act is to be taken as a congressional determination that a
month (roughly) is enough time to force a tender offer to be kept open,
fifty days is too much."
But, drawing from the notions of investor autonomy contained in the
29. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 251 (1983); REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § I 1.01(a)
(1984). State merger provisions generally require that the directors approve the merger plan before
submitting it to shareholders for approval. Tender offers, on the other hand, bypass target manage-
ment. The bidder makes an offer to purchase shares directly from shareholders. A significant, if not
predominent feature, of second generation state statutes is an attempt to create a stronger role for
target management in a tender offer. Control share acquisition statutes accomplish this by exempt-
ing statutory mergers from the terms of the statute. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.01 I subd.
38 (West 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.407(10) (Vernon Supp. 1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.01(Z)(2) (Page 1985). Statutory mergers require only a majority vote of the shareholders,
including the bidder. Thus, if the supermajority shareholder voting provisions of control share ac-
quisition statutes sufficiently increase the cost of a hostile takeover to a bidder as some suggest, see
infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text, the bidder will prefer to negotiate a friendly, less costly
deal with target management.
30. See, eg., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.671 (West 1985 & Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 351.407 (Vernon Supp. 1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Page 1985). Each of these
statutes requires a "supermajority" vote of the shareholders. Ohio and Minnesota require a majority
vote of the shares held by "disinterested" shareholders; Missouri requires a two-thirds vote of the
"disinterested" shareholders.
31. See statutes cited supra note 30.
32. 794 F.2d at 263.
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plurality opinion in MITE,3 3 the courts also found the requirement of
shareholder approval inconsistent with the purposes of the Williams Act.
According to Judge Posner, subjecting a tender offer to a vote of the
shareholders put the acquirer at the "tender mercies" of the disinterested
shareholders.34 Another court maintained that shareholder approval
took the decision to tender "out of the hands of the shareholder and
placed it in the hands of management and other shareholders."35 In a
similar vein, one court criticized the shareholder approval requirement as
depriving the investor of the ability to make an independent decision,
exclusive of the other shareholders in the company.36
III. ANALYSIS
In invalidating the control share acquisition statutes at issue in these
cases, the courts seized on the language of the MITE plurality too ea-
gerly and applied it with questionable validity. In light of the Illinois
provisions before the Court in MITE, the focus on the additional delay
created by the control share acquisition statutes seems overstated, if not
misplaced. If delay helps incumbent management, the longer delay af-
forded by these statutes arguably helps it more. But the MITE plural-
ity's disapproval of a measure that might delay a takeover indefinitely
should not necessarily result in the invalidation of statutes that would
delay a takeover seven weeks rather than the four weeks prescribed by
the Williams Act. Measured by the possible deterrent effect additional
delay would have on potential tender offerors-the overriding concern of
Congress in refusing to introduce further delay into the tender offer pro-
cess17-control share acquisition statutes are almost certainly distin-
guishable from the Illinois statute involved in MITE.
It is also important to remember that federal regulation was intended
to delay the tender offer process and provides for a minimum twenty
business day delay.38 This delay affords shareholders additional time in
which to decide whether or not to tender their shares and affords target
management time to respond to an offer. Without ascribing too much
importance to these aspects of the federal regulation, nevertheless the
33. See supra notes 24 & 26 and accompanying text.
34. 794 F.2d at 262.
35. Icahn, 612 F. Supp. at 1420.
36. Fleet Aerospace, 637 F. Supp. at 758.
37. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 2813; SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 3.
38. See supra notes 12 & 14 and accompanying text.
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additional three week delay might actually be consistent with the Wil-
liams Act.
It requires a similar leap in logic to conclude that requiring share-
holder approval of a tender offer is as destructive of investor autonomy as
allowing a state official to block a takeover if he finds it inequitable. Ma-
jority shareholder approval admittedly diminishes an individual inves-
tor's autonomy to some extent.39 But it leaves the decision in the hands
of the shareholders as a group, the locus of other major decisions about
the direction of corporate policy.4° And certainly majority shareholder
approval is far closer to the sphere of investor decisionmaking than a
requirement that a state official give the tender offer his imprimatur.
Moreover, shareholder approval of a proposed tender offer at a meeting
called for that purpose eliminates the coercive nature of tender offers
which Congress sought to remedy.41
On a more fundamental level, extending the reasoning of the MITE
plurality to control share acquisition statutes implicates a much broader
range of state regulation of corporations. In fact, the control share ac-
quisition statutes themselves, even though they directly regulate tender
offers,42 parallel traditional aspects of state regulation of corporations.43
In focusing on delay, the MITE plurality emphasized that delay permits
incumbent management to take additional steps to defeat a bid, thereby
39. The individual investor is no longer free to sell his shares to a tender offeror without the
consent of the holders of a (super)majority of the corporation's outstanding shares. Moreover, be-
cause the market price of the shares would reflect the uncertainty surrounding the shareholder vote,
selling into the market would not be an adequate alternative.
40. The Revised Model Business Corporation Act, for example, requires a shareholder vote to
elect the corporation's directors (REv. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. § 7.28 (1984)), to amend the arti-
cles of incorporation (id. at § 10.03), and to approve fundamental corporate changes such as mergers
(id. at § 11.01), share exchanges (id. at § 11.02), and a sale of substantially all of the corporation's
assets, except in the regular course of business (id. at §§ 12.01 & 12.02).
41. Cf supra note 12 and accompanying text. Tender offers are illustrative of the "prisoners'
dilemma." An individual shareholder, even though he believes the tender offer price is inadequate,
will tender his shares pursuant to the offer fearing that because the other prisoners, the other share-
holders, may not share his views and thus may tender their shares, he will be left as a minority
shareholder in a close corporation. All shareholders face the same dilemma and therefore tender
their shares, ensuring the success of the bid. Control share acquisition statutes eliminate this prob-
lem by permitting the shareholders to get together-to come to a consensus about the offer-before
tendering their shares.
42. The fact that control share acquisition statutes directly regulate the tender offer transaction
could provide a means by which the Court could distinguish other forms of second-generation state
regulation. The other types of second-generation statutes generally regulate second-step merger
transactions and thus have a less direct effect on the tender offer transaction.
43. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
[Vol. 65:292
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increasing the expected cost of a takeover to a potential bidder, and thus
discouraging takeover bids." It viewed the Williams Act as expressly
forbidding this result. This notion of the Act could be applied with equal
force to other forms of state regulation which similarly increase the bid-
der's takeover costs.45 Moreover, much of state corporate law can be
construed as taking tender offer decisions out of the hands of individual
shareholders, contrary to the concept of investor autonomy.46 Thus, ex-
tending the reasoning of the MITE plurality would likely federalize
much of state corporate law.
Such a result would seem to conflict with another line of Supreme
Court authority expressed most clearly in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green.47 In Santa Fe the Court declined to expand the reach of rule lOb-
5 to allegations of corporate mismanagement,48 holding that a rule lOb-5
cause of action must allege an element of deception.49 But the Court
stated further:
[T]his extension of the federal securities laws would overlap and quite possi-
bly interfere with state law .... Absent a clear indication of congressional
intent, we are reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of
corporations that deals with transactions in securities, particularly where
established state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden.50
The Court found no such intention in section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.
Similarly, no such intention appears in the Williams Act. Indeed, such
a result would appear to be foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision in
Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc.," which draws from and parallels
Santa Fe. In Schreiber, the plaintiff alleged facts that suggested that tar-
get management benefitted in a takeover bid at the expense of sharehold-
44. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 635; cf id. at 643-44.
45. See Thompson, supra note 27.
46. See id.
47. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
48. The plaintiffs in Santa Fe challenged a short-form merger effected in conformity with state
law. They alleged that management intentionally undervalued the company's stock for its own bene-
fit. These actions allegedly violated rule lOb-5 which proscribes "any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud," 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1986). 430 U.S. at 466-68. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit agreed and held that rule lob-5 encompassed a shareholder's claim "that the majority has
committed a breach of its fiduciary duty to deal fairly with minority shareholders by effecting the
merger without any justifiable business purpose." Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283,
1291 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
49. 430 U.S. at 473-74.
50. Id. at 479.
51. 105 S. Ct. 2458 (1985).
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ers.52 The Court read section 14(e) of the Exchange Act to require an
element of deception. 3 Thus, as in Santa Fe, the Court refused to find a
cause of action for conduct seemingly governed by state law.
IV. CONCLUSION
The reasoning employed in recent cases invalidating state regulation of
takeovers compels the conclusion that the Williams Act preempts any
state regulation that increases the cost of a takeover bid or that takes the
tender offer decision out of the hands of individual investors. This con-
clusion, however, does not follow necessarily from the Supreme Court's
decision in Edgar v. MITE Corp. Moreover, it seems to conflict with
another well-established line of Supreme Court authority. There may be
sound practical reasons for limiting all state regulation of corporate take-
overs. 4 But Congress did not contemplate such a result when it enacted
the Williams Act.
Karen A. Winn
52. Id. at 2460-61.
53. Id. at 2461-65.
54. See generally Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation,
6 J. LEGAL STUDIES 251 (1977).
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